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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2003, red phones lit up in corporate defense offices across
the United States (U.S.). That day, the Supreme Court published its Green
Tree v. Bazzle' opinion, which placed the decision of whether to permit
class-wide arbitrations in the hands of arbitrators, rather than the courts.2
Although the Court's plurality opinion offered a less than resounding
answer,3 the holding resolved a narrow issue that had been debated widely in
both federal and state courts.4
The decision in Green Tree was based on two sources of law: the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and a line of Supreme Court decisions regarding
arbitration. Although the FAA does not specifically address class
arbitration, 5 two of its provisions-§§ 2 and 4-are relevant in this context.6
Section 2 states that arbitration agreements written in a commercial context
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" unless the agreement's terms
are contractually invalid. 7  Therefore, when construing arbitration
agreements, courts must use basic principles of contract law,8 including
interpreting ambiguous terms "in favor of arbitration."9
* Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
Id.
2 Id. at 451-52.
3 As one author stated, "All plurality decisions have about them a kind of suspect
authenticity, rather like an unsigned Picasso." Michael G. Sullivan & A. Camden Lewis,
Class-Wide Arbitration After Green Tree, 15 S.C. LAW. 20, 22 (2004).
4 Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 356 (S.C. 2002).
5 See, e.g., New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1988) (stating that "the [FAA] makes no reference to consolidation of arbitrations").
Indeed, after Green Tree was decided, the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
issued supplementary rules to govern the question of class-wide arbitration disputes.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATION (effective Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936
(last visited Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY RULES].
6 See Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 454; Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
7 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
8 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (addressing a
dispute over the interpretation of a "workout" clause requiring arbitration between
investors and an investing company, the Court stated that, if the parties agreed to arbitrate
a certain dispute, "courts generally should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern
the formation of contracts"); see also Howsarn v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83
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Section 4 of the FAA establishes that if the parties have agreed to an
arbitration clause, courts may order the parties to arbitrate "in accordance
with the terms of the agreement."' 10 In the last ten years, the Supreme Court
decided two cases that helped define the court system's role in interpreting
arbitration agreements and determining if an agreement was formed. 1 In
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Court grappled with the
question of whether the arbitrator or the courts should decide which claims
the particular arbitration agreement encompassed. 12 The Court determined
that unless the arbitration agreement clearly states that the arbitrator must
settle issues of arbitrability, the courts should determine if the parties agreed
to arbitrate. 13 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds further developed this
concept by clarifying the role of courts in determining arbitrability. 14 There,
the Court limited the court system's role to deciding issues where the parties
to the contract "would likely have expected a court to have decided the
gateway matter." This limitation ensured that the arbitration did not include
more issues than those to which the parties actually agreed. 15
However, after the First Options and Howsam cases, federal and state
courts were reaching differing conclusions on the validity of class
arbitration.' 6 On one side of the debate, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits determined that class arbitrations could
not be initiated unless the agreement permitted such consolidation.' 7
(2002) (stating that "arbitration is a matter of contract" and the arbitration agreement
should be interpreted as such); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (using contract law to interpret a collective
bargaining agreement).
9 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)
(interpreting an arbitration clause governing a dispute between an auto manufacturer and
its distributor while considering that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration"); see also United Steelworkers,
363 U.S.- at 582-83 (stating that "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute").
10 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
11 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 79; First Options, 514 U.S. at 938.
12 First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
13 Id. at 944-47.
14 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
15 Id. at 83-84.
16 Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 356 (S.C. 2002).
17 Champ v. Siegel Trading Co:, 55 F.3d 269, 274-75, 277 (7th Cir. 1995)
(containing a comprehensive list of cases from each of the federal courts listed above and
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However, the First Circuit and the Pennsylvania and California Supreme
Courts took the opposite view, determining that arbitrations could be
consolidated under ambiguous contract provisions. 18 In order to help resolve
this split, the Court once again revisited the line between courts and
arbitrators in interpreting arbitration clauses.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Green Tree case originated from two sets of plaintiffs, (1) Lynn and
Burt Bazzle and (2) Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs, both of
whom entered into contracts for financial loans with Green Tree Financial
Corporation. 19 Each of the contracts contained an arbitration clause reading
that, "All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this
contract or the relationships which result from this contract ... shall be
resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent
of you.' '20 The two sets of plaintiffs filed actions separately in South Carolina
state courts. They alleged that Green Tree had failed to provide them with a
form statutorily required for loan agreements under South Carolina law.
2
'
deciding that, under a strict interpretation of the arbitration clause, class arbitration
should not be permitted when the parties have not explicitly agreed to allow it).
18 See New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st
Cir. 1988) (determining that class arbitration would be valid in a broadly written
arbitration clause because interpreting the contract in this manner did not go directly
against its terms and was not preempted by the FAA); Keating v. Superior Court, 645
P.2d 1192, 1207 (Cal. 1982) (determining that a broad arbitration clause should be read
to include class arbitration claims because to read it otherwise would force "hundreds or
perhaps thousands of individuals asserting claims involving common issues of fact and
law to litigate them in separate proceedings against a party with vastly superior
resources"); Dickler v. Shearson, 596 A.2d 860, 863-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating
that when an arbitration clause does not expressly state a certain matter, such as the
validity of a class-wide arbitration, the state court could substitute its pro-arbitration
policies to allow such claims).
19 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447-48 (2003). The first set of
plaintiffs, the Bazzles, entered into a contract with Green Tree for a home improvement
loan in 1995. Id. The second set of plaintiffs, Lackey and the Buggses, entered into nearly
identical contracts with Green Tree for loans and security agreements to purchase mobile
homes. Id. at 448.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 448-49; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-102 (Law. Co-op. 2002). This
section of the South Carolina Code requires that creditors obtaining loans for consumer
purposes that are "secured in whole or in part by a lien on real estate" must obtain the
names of the debtor's attorney and the insurance agent the debtor chooses to provide
flood and hazard insurance for the property. Id. This statute was written to protect
599
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In 1997, the Bazzles requested that the court certify their claims as a
class action, which Green Tree countered by enjoining the action and filing a
motion to compel arbitration. 22 The district court certified the class and
ordered the parties to arbitrate.23 An arbitrator was selected according to the
contract terms and awarded the class nearly $11 million in damages and
attorney fees. 24 Meanwhile, Lackey and the Buggses had been pursuing a
similar claim and asked a second district court judge to certify their claims as
a class action.25 Although the trial court ruled that the arbitration clause was
unenforceable, an appellate court overruled this decision, sending the case to
arbitration. 26 The parties chose an arbitrator who, based on the prior decision
in the Bazzles' case, certified the class of plaintiffs and eventually awarded
them over $9 million in damages and attorney fees. 27
In both cases, after the trial court upheld the arbitrator's decision, Green
Tree filed a motion with the South Carolina Court of Appeals arguing against
the validity of class arbitration. 28 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
withdrew the cases from the appellate court, consolidated them, and
ultimately ruled that because the contracts did not address class arbitration,
the class certifications were permissible.29 Green Tree then filed a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was granted to answer the
question of "whether an arbitration may proceed as a class action in the
absence of specific language in the arbitration agreement permitting class
treatment in arbitration. ' 30
consumers "against unfair practices by some suppliers of consumer credit." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-102(d) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The South Carolina Supreme Court also stated
that the intent of the statute was to "protect borrowers by requiring in the credit
application clear and prominent disclosure of the information necessary" for the debtor's
choice of legal counsel and insurance agent. Davis v. Nations Credit Fin. Servs. Corp.,
484 S.E.2d 471,472 (S.C. 1997).
22 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 449.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 450.
30 Joint Appendix, Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444, petition for cert. filed, 2002
U.S. Briefs 634, *15 (U.S. Oct. 23, 2002) (No. 02-634).
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III. COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Court's decision in Green Tree was divided into three main
opinions: the plurality written by Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion, and the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist.31 The Justices were
divided on two main issues. The first question addressed the contractual
interpretation of the arbitration clause. The second issue involved
differentiating between state and federal law in arbitration disputes.
A. Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion looked to the language of the arbitration clause,
and, reading the phrase "selected by us with consent of you" broadly,
determined that the contract language did not definitively forbid class
arbitration. 32 Justice Breyer then examined the clause's broad grant of
authority to the arbitrator, which permitted the arbitrator to resolve "all
disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract. 33
The plurality also reiterated that, typically, courts are only to decide certain
"gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration
agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to
a certain type of controversy." 34 Given this language, the plurality saw the
issue in Green Tree as falling out of the narrow scope of issues to be decided
by the courts. Instead, the plurality determined that the question in Green
Tree addressed a procedural quandary of what type of arbitration should
occur-an issue the Court felt was better left for arbitrators to decide.35
Applying this reasoning to the plaintiffs' cases, Justice Breyer remanded the
case to the arbitrator to determine whether or not the contracts in question
permitted class arbitration. 36
31 Justice Thomas also wrote a dissent stating that the FAA does not apply to state
courts and that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision should be upheld. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 460.
32 Id. at 451.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 452.
35 Id. at 452-53.
36 Id. at 454.
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B. Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens addressed three distinct issues.
First, he determined that the FAA did not expressly prohibit class action
arbitrations. 37 Second, he pointed out that the contract should be interpreted
using South Carolina law because the arbitration stipulated as such. 38 Finally,
Justice Stevens noted that Green Tree only challenged the merits of the case
without calling into question the role of the arbitrator. 39 Given these three
views, Justice Stevens stated that he would have simply affirmed the ruling
of the South Carolina Supreme Court on an -interpretation of South Carolina
contract law that did not conflict with the FAA.4° However, instead of
strictly following this line of reasoning, Justice Stevens created a plurality by
concurring with Justice Breyer "because Justice Breyer' s opinion expresses a
view of the case close to [Stevens'] own. '41
37 Id. at 454-55.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. In making this determination, Justice Stevens cited an equally contentious case
decided by the Supreme Court in 1945. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). In
that case, the Supreme Court was examining the convictions of three police officers
accused of beating a man to death after arresting him for allegedly stealing a tire. Id. at
92-93. The case was brought before the Court to determine whether the trial of the
officers on federal grounds was permissible. Id. at 107. The Court's decision was
splintered, rendering a total of four opinions. Id. at 134. Four justices determined that the
officers' federal trial was permissible, but ordered a retrial on the grounds of incorrect
jury instructions. Id. at 106-07. A dissenting opinion by Justice Murphy argued that the
case should not be remanded for jury trial, but should be upheld on the original federal
conviction. Id. at 137-38. A second dissenting opinion argued that the officers should not
be tried in the federal system. Id. at 138-39. Finally, in the opinion cited by Justice
Stevens, Justice Rutledge determined that, although he essentially agreed with Justice
Murphy's dissent, deciding this way would create a "stalemate [which] should not prevail
for any reason, however compelling, in a criminal cause or, if avoidable, in any other."
Id. at 134. Therefore, Justice Rutledge created a plurality that upheld the legality of the
federal trial and permitted the retrial to occur in the federal system. Id. at 134. Justice
Stevens's position in Green Tree was similar to that of Justice Rutledge. In Green Tree,
Stevens essentially agreed with the determination that the arbitration clause should allow
for class-wide arbitrations, but would have allowed the state law interpretation to stand
instead of imposing federal law. Green Tree Fin. Corp., '539 U.S. at 455.
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C. Dissent
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that class
certification questions in arbitration should be determined by courts instead
of the arbitrator.42 The Chief Justice reasoned that determining who arbitrates
a dispute is similar to the gateway decision of what is to be submitted to the
arbitrator. Therefore, this issue should be decided by the courts.43 The Chief
Justice then adopted a narrow reading of the contract language, sta ting that
the language of the contract is "quite clear that petitioner must select, and
each buyer must agree to, a particular arbitrator for disputes between the
petitioner and that specific buyer."44 The Chief Justice argued that class
action arbitration could not be reconciled with this provision because class
arbitration would not allow each party, and specifically the petitioner, to
choose different arbitrators for different cases.45 Therefore, the Chief Justice
rejected the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision to allow class
arbitration because this determination was contrary to the agreement's
express terms and therefore violated the policy of the FAA.46
IV. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
The Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree is wide-reaching and could
have a significant impact on corporate arbitration agreements.47 Its effects
will most likely touch four main groups--defendants, arbitrators, plaintiffs,
and courts-in vastly different ways.
A. Impact on Defendants
Arguably, the most significant impact of the Green Tree decision will
fall on corporations hoping to avoid class-action arbitration. 48 In recent
42 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 455.
43 Id. at 456.
44 Id. at 459.
45 Id.
4 6 Id. at 459-60.
47 Peter J. Kreher & Pat D. Robinson I, Substance, Process, and' the Future of
Class Arbitration, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 409, 421 (2004); Brooks R. Burdette &
Michael E. Swartz, Employment Law: 'Green Tree' Creates New Concern for Arbitration
Clause Drafters, July 31, 2003, N.Y. L.J., at 5.
48 Corporations have various incentives to avoid seeking class action arbitration.
See, e.g., Glenn A. Danas, Comment' The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of
1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305,
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years, corporations have been turning more frequently to arbitration clauses
for a variety of reasons, including increased confidentiality and the historic
inability of plaintiffs to band together through class-action arbitrations. 49
However, under Green Tree, a corporation's choice to enforce an arguably
ambiguous arbitration agreement could result in class arbitration. 50
Corporate counsel's immediate response to Green Tree will most likely
be an attempt to structure a "class-proof' arbitration clause by explicitly
forbidding class arbitrations. 51 However, some courts have hinted or
determined that state unconscionability law may not permit such blanket
clauses. 52 Indeed, in Green Tree, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated in
a footnote that "preclusion of class-wide or consolidated arbitration in an
adhesion contract, even if explicit, undermines principles favoring
1305 (2000) (implying that, without class actions, corporations can use a divide and
conquer method by using procedural rules to make individual cases uneconomical);
Charles Silver, We're Scared to Death: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1357, 1357-58 (2003) (stating that some courts believe class actions allow
"plaintiffs with weak claims to threaten an entire industry with bankruptcy" by banding
together and creating a huge incentive for the corporation to settle). However, some
corporations may prefer class-action claims, as this type of lawsuit has "significantly
reduced industry's costs of collections, litigation, damage exposure, and settlements."
Duncan A. MacDonald, Letter to the Editor: A Different View On Green Tree Arbitration
Ruling, AM. BANKER, July 11, 2003, at 8. For an interesting study on class action cases,
see Thomas E. Willging et al., Symposium, The Institute of Judicial Administration
Research Conference on Class Actions: Class Actions and the Rulemaking Process: An
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv.
74 (1996).
49 Robert Alexander Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The
TILA Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 809-10 (2003) (stating that
"[b]usinesses have become enamored of arbitration clauses" because they believe that
arbitration is a "faster, cheaper, and more predictable method of resolving a dispute than
the typical lawsuit in the public courts"). Recently, one author stated that, in "cars, fixed
loan, and retail products, arbitration provisions appear in at least 500 million consumer
agreements." MacDonald, supra note 48, at 8.
50 Sullivan & Lewis, supra note 3, at 25.
51 Paul W. Taylor, The Future of Class Action Arbitration: This Year's 'Green Tree'
Decision Means that Unambiguous Drafting is Needed to Forestall Proceedings, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 17, 2003, at 23; see also Rene M. Johnson & Samuel Estreicher, Supreme
Court Vacates Classwide Awards: Whether the Agreement Authorizes Arbitration of
Class Claims is for the Arbitrator, N.J. L.J., Sept. 29, 2003 (reviewing the possibility of
blanket arbitration clauses and what defenses could be posed against them).
52 Johnson & Estreicher, supra note 51. For an excellent discussion on a California
line of cases grappling with this decision and a projection of how the United States
Supreme Court will likely decide this issue, see Kreher & Robinson, supra note 47, at
425-27.
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expeditious and equitable case disposition absent demonstrated prejudice to
the drafter of the adhesive contract. 53
However, some authors have suggested that corporations wishing to
avoid class-action arbitrations may have more options than simply writing a
blanket ban into their arbitration clauses. 54 Instead, corporations could
modify their current arbitration clauses to make class arbitration less
appealing to plaintiffs. 55 For example, if a company's current arbitration
clause calls for parties to split the arbitration fees, the company could modify
its clause to provide that if plaintiffs choose to bring a class-action
arbitration, the plaintiffs must bear the entire cost of the arbitration. 56
Another option for defendants is to create an arbitration clause that limits the
arbitrator's power.57 For example, a New York federal district court recently
addressed an arbitration agreement that provided for the arbitrator to decide
"'any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to tax and tax related
services' rendered by the Ernst & Young Defendants to the Individual
Plaintiffs. '58 The district court determined that this agreement allowed the
court, not the arbitrator, to interpret any procedural or forum-based issues
arising from the arbitration agreement. 59
Regardless of the exact steps taken, though, one post-Green Tree
guarantee is that arbitration clauses will remain on the radar of corporate
counsel.
B. Impact on Arbitrators
The Green Tree decision will also have a tremendous effect on
arbitrators. Before Green Tree, arbitrators could rely on courts to determine
complex issues of class certification, including "concerns about due process
rights for the unrepresented class members, the logistics of certifying a class,
and... discovery." 6 However, the Green Tree decision seems to place
53 Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 n.21 (S.C. 2002); see also
Sullivan & Lewis, supra note 3, at 24-25 (discussing the implications this footnote may
have on future cases involving class-wide arbitration).
54 Craig R. Tractenberg, Class Actions Brought Against Franchisors in Arbitration
Cases, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 22, 2003, at 5.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Camferdam v. Ernst & Young Int'l, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9092, at *4-
7 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
58 Id. at *6.
59 Id. at *6-7.
60 Kreher & Robinson, supra note 47, at 422.
605
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
many of these fairly complex legal issues-including the issue of interpreting
a contract to determine if it implicitly contains an arbitration agreement-in
the hands of arbitrators, who may or may not have formal legal training.61
In order to buffer this effect, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) has created guidelines to deal with the issues stemming from Green
Tree.62 These supplementary rules provide that arbitrators must first answer
the threshold question of whether the arbitration clause can be construed to
allow class action arbitration. 63 After making this determination, the rules
stipulate that the arbitrator must then decide whether to certify the class. 64
This portion of the rule is similar to the certification of class action procedure
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, including requiring "notice to the class
and opportunity to object to any settlement or dismissal. '65 One unique
aspect of the AAA's guidelines is that the guidelines require a thirty-day stay
period after arbitrators' major decisions in order for the parties to challenge
the outcome in a court.66 However, because arbitrators' determinations are
rarely overturned by courts "absent fraud, corruption or mistake," these
stipulations may not have any overwhelming affect.67
Although the AAA provides guidance for certain disputes falling under
its jurisdiction, these rules do not cover every dispute or every arbitrator.68
Therefore, in the years following Green Tree, confusion may exist among
61 For example, in abnormally complex cases, the AAA requires that arbitrators
have 15 years of "senior level business experience or legal practice" and undergo training
on a variety of issues in ADR. AAA, Fact Sheet: Enhanced Arbitrator Selection Process
for Large Complex Cases, in RULES AND PROCEDURES FACTS SHEETS, available at
http://www.adr.org/upload/LIVESITE/Rules Procedures/FactSheets/ArbSelec.pdf (last
visited Sept. 22, 2004) (emphasis added). The NASD requires arbitrators to have "at least
five years of business or professional experience ... [and] at least two years of college-
level credits" along with a four-hour course. NASD, Frequently Asked Questions about
Becoming a NASD Arbitrator, in RECRUITMENT, available at
http://www.nasdadr.com/arbitrator-faqs.asp#experience (last modified May 19, 2004).
62 SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 5. For a discussion of the AAA's rules, see
Arbitration of Class Action Litigation to Rise, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., Apr. 9,
2004; Tractenberg, supra note 54; Burdette & Swartz, supra note 47.
63 SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 5, at R. 3.
64 Id. at R. 4.
65 Tractenberg, supra note 54.
66 Id.
67 Id.; see also Norman S. Posner, Arbitration: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 471, 471-72 (1988)
(discussing the standards courts must use to review arbitrator awards).
68 Tractenberg, supra note 54.
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arbitrators on how to interpret an ambiguous contract clause concerning
arbitration and how to certify classes.
C. Impact on Plaintiffs
A third group that will be affected by the Green Tree decision is
plaintiffs, both in consumer rights litigation and beyond. 69 For consumer
rights litigation, the Green Tree decision creates the possibility for a new
forum-shopping strategy that could ensure consumers' right to class-wide
arbitration. 70 With this strategy, an attorney could have several claimants file
individual arbitration claims with several arbitrators in hopes that at least one
of them will certify the class.71 The successful plaintiffs could then, along
with the rest of the class, consolidate the claims into the certified class-action
arbitration, which may be well worth the initial costs of filing multiple
arbitration claims.72 This possibility has the effect of "virtually guaranteeing
that all future multiple-claimant arbitrations will eventually be certified for
class arbitration"-an effect that may or may not have been intended by the
Court.
7 3
A second question for plaintiffs and their attorneys is whether the Green
Tree decision extends to arbitration agreements in other contexts, particularly
employees wishing to file discrimination cases against employers. 74 Pre-
Green Tree, arbitration clauses mandating arbitration for the settlement of
discrimination claims in the workplace had been met with varying success. 75
However, after Green Tree, plaintiffs' lawyers in the employment context
have more solid ground on which to stand when bringing previously
unsuccessful class arbitration claims, especially when considered "in the
light of the statutory purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statues" that
may prohibit employers from blanket bans of class arbitrations. 76
69 Merrick T. Rossein, Supreme Court Hands Arbitrators the Keys to the Class
Action, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, Dec. 16, 2003, at 1; Taylor, supra note 51.
70 Taylor, supra note 51.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Rossein, supra note 69, at 1.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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D. Impact on Courts
The Green Tree decision also will have a significant impact on how
courts interpret arbitration clauses. In one of the first post-Green Tree
decisions, the Fifth Circuit addressed an arbitration clause governed by Texas
law.77 In that case, the Fifth Circuit determined that because Texas
arbitration law inherently included the FAA, the Green Tree decision
effectively overruled the Fifth Circuit's prior decision that the court, and not
arbitrators, should make the determination of whether or not to consolidate
arbitration.78 If the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit is mirrored elsewhere,
courts may yet have a role to play in class arbitration proceedings by
deciding whether the arbitration clause is governed strictly by state law or if
the FAA is implicitly included in all such agreements. 79
Under Green Tree, courts also retain their role of determining whether
certain provisions in the arbitration agreement are gateway issues to be
decided by the courts.80 For example, a post-Green Tree federal district court
case addressed this very issue when determining whether the court or the
arbitrator should decide the meaning of the forum-selection portion of the
arbitration clause.81 The court there ultimately determined that this issue was
one that courts could decide based on ensuring that the arbitration proceeded
"according to the terms of the agreement. '82 This case may indicate that
courts have a choice of whether to apply their duties under Green Tree
narrowly, therefore keeping the courts involved in arbitration cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Like many Supreme Court decisions, the Green Tree opinion seems to
create more questions than it answers. Although the Court did come down
with a firm ruling about who should determine whether to permit class-action
77 Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nation's Personnel of Tex., Inc., 343
F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2003).
78 Id. at 361-62.
79 Latham & Watkins, Class Action Arbitration: The Green Tree Decision and Other
Recent Developments, CLIENT ALERT, Sept. 23, 2003, at 3 (reviewing the implications of
the Fifth Circuit's decision), available at
http://www.lw.comresource/PublicationsLpdf/pub815.pdf.
80 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003).
81 Richard C. Young & Co. v. Leventhal, 298 F. Supp. 2d 160, 167-68 (D. Mass.
2003).
82 Id. at 174.
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arbitrations, the decision also left several issues open, including how more
limited arbitration clauses will be interpreted, the role that state law will play
in future arbitration agreements, and the adjustments that will be made by
plaintiffs, arbitrators, courts, and defendants. With this myriad of questions,
one thing remains certain-further litigation.
Erin Davies
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